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RECENT DECISIONS
special rules of evidence for different causes of action. Had the
Court abolished the unavailability requirement, then the pre-
cedential effect of this case would not have been limited to
fidelity bond cases. There is no reason, for example, why the
statements of a former officer of a corporation, who is present for
cross-examination, which statements admit liability for an act done
while in the capacity of an officer, should be excluded as affirma-
tive evidence against the corporation. Similar reasoning would
apply to the statements of a former agent, employee, partner, or
former joint owner of property, which were made in the course of
the relationship. The Court of Appeals, rather than clarifying the
clouded state of the law of hearsay, merely added to the confusion
created by centuries of judicial evasiveness in establishing "rules"
of evidence.
LABOR LAW - UNION COERCION OF GENERAL CONTRACTOR
CAUSING HIM TO DISCRIMINATE AGAINST SUBCONTRACTOR EM-
PLOYEES HELD NOT TO BE AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE SINCE THE
EMPLOYEES WERE NOT HIS OWN. - A union local, whose members
were employed by a general contractor, picketed a construction site
and conducted a work stoppage to protest a subcontractor's use of
non-union labor, thereby forcing the general contractor to cancel its
contract with the subcontractor. The subcontractor filed an unfair
labor practice charge against the union alleging unlawful coercion of
the general contractor forcing him to discriminate against the sub-
contractor's employees. The National Labor Relations Board held
that no unfair labor practice was committed by the union because
the prohibition against the unlawful coercion of an employer which
forces him to discriminate against employees applies only where
the employees are those of the coerced employer. Local 447,
United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumb-
ing and Pipefitting Iwdustry (Malbaff), 172 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 5 CCH
LAB. L. REP. (1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec.) 22,652 (June 24, 1968).
The original National Labor Relations Act ' [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the NLRA], was passed for the express purpose of
eliminating the causes underlying labor disputes which obstructed
interstate commerce,2 but was generally thought to be too labor and
' The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) of 1935 was amend-
ed by the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) of 1947
and the Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin
Act) of 1959 and is currently found in 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1964).
2 Myers, The Vational Labor Relations Act in Strike Situations,
18 B.U.L. REv. 282, 283-84 (1938).
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employee oriented.3 The reaction to this imbalance between labor
and management culminated in the Taft-Hartley Act amendment of
the NLRA 4 [hereinafter referred to as the Act]. The amendment
was thought necessary to "furnish additional protection to the
individual worker, to correct what [was] . . . conceived to be an
imbalance between labor and management, and to shield neutral
employers and the public when outside the indicated pale of a labor
dispute." 5
Generally, section 8(b) (2) of the Act is dispositive of the
rights of the individual worker insofar as unfair union labor prac-
tices are concerned. 6 This section is inextricably intertwined with
section 8(b) (1) (A) which prohibits direct union coercion of em-
ployees.7 Section 8(a) (3) is also pertinent s for if an employer
be in violation of this section for having succumbed to union pres-
ure, then the union would perforce be guilty of violating sections
8(b) (2) and 8(b) (1) (A).9 The Supreme Court, speaking of the
addition of section 8(b) (1) (A) under the Taft-Hartley Act, said:
It was the intent of Congress to impose upon unions the same
restrictions which the Wagner Act imposed on employers with respect
to violations of employee rights.10
But what, exactly, is an employee?
The NLRA states that an employee "shall include any em-
ployee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular
employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise . . . ." "
3 R. Smrrn, L. MExRnrmm & T. ST. ANrOiN= LABOR RE Tos LAW
37 (4th ed. 1968).
4 Id. at 46-48.
5Feldesman, Act, Board and Critics: A Few ABC's, 36 N.Y.S.B.J. 382,
383 (1964).
6 "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents . . . to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) ... ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2)
(1964) (emphasis added).
7 "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents . . . to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed [them] . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 159 (b) (1) (A) (1964) (emphasis
added).
a "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . by dis-
crimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158
(a) (3) (1964).
9UAW Local 291 (Wisconsin Axle), 92 N.L.R.B. 968 (1950).
20 ILGWU (Bernhard-Altman Texas Corp.) v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731
(1961) (emphasis added). For a study of the legislative intent see S. REP.
No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (Supp. Views) ; 1 Leg. Hist. 456 (1947);
II Leg. Hist. 1199, 1204, 1207 (1947).1329 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964) (emphasis added).
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But the extent of the meaning of this term has nevertheless been
the subject of much interpretation.' The net effect of varying
judicial statements of the meaning of "employee" has been that
the NLRB now applies what it calls the "right-of-control" test,
which will indicate an employer-employee relationship where it is
found that "control is retained over the manner and means by
which the result is to be accomplished." 13 In one case, the prime
contractor was found guilty of a section 8(a) (3) violation because
he was able to exercise sufficient control over the subcontractor's
employees. Union violations of sections 8(b) (2) and 8(b) (1) (A)
were also found since the union had demanded that the prime con-
tractor only grant employment to those workers who were approved
by the union hiring hall.1
4
The instant case overruled, in part, the 1959 decision in North-
ern California Chapter, Association of General Contractors (St.
Maurice, Helinkamp & Musser)1z (commonly referred to as
Musser), which was prosecuted along lines similar to the instant
case. In Musser, the general contractor had let a subcontract to
Musser for field engineering and survey work. Due to the Musser
employees' affiliation with a different bargaining group than that
used by the general contractor, the general contractor's labor group
caused a work stoppage, which eventually culminated in the gen-
eral contractor being forced to cancel its subcontract with Musser.
The National Labor Relations Board [hereinafter referred to as
the Board] found, inter alia, that the union had been guilty of
unfair labor practices, as defined under sections 8(b) (2) and
8(b) (1) (A), by forcing the general contractor to discriminate
against the Musser employees by terminating their work through
cancellation of the subcontract.
12in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 191-92 (1941), the
Court stated: "The broad definition of 'employee,' unless the Act explicitly
states otherwise, . . . expressed the conviction of Congress that disputes
may arise regardless of whether disputants stand in the proximate relation
of employer and employee." See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322
U.S. 111 (1944); Minnesota Milk Co. v. NLRB, 314 F.2d 761 (8th Cir.
1963).
131958 NLRB, TwmTn-THmnD Aqx. REP. 40 (1958). If the control
retained is only over the results to be accomplished, an independent con-
tractor relationship will be found which is outside the scope of the Act
Id. The test was applied recently in NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 36
U.S.L.W. 4218 (U.S. March 6, 1968).
'4H.E. Stoudt & Son, 114 N.L.R.B. 838 (1955). Accord, West Texas
Utilities Co., 108 N.L.P.B. 407 (1954), enforced, 218 F.2d 824 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 953 (1955).
15119 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1957), aff'd sub itmi. Operating Eng'r Local 3
v. NLRB, 266 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 834 (1959).
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The court reached its conclusion 16 mainly by construing the
terms "an employer" and "an employee" as used in the Act. The
majority reasoned that a direct employer-employee relationship need
not exist. In other words, union activity would be illegal were it
to force any employer to discriminate against any employee, and
not necessarily one of his own employees.' 7 To emphasize this
point, the Board noted that other portions of the Act expressly
limit their coverage to an employer's own employees.' s Additional
reliance was placed upon a prior Board decision which had stated
that "Section 8(a) (3) does not limit its prohibitions to acts of an
employer vis-i-vis his own employees." " The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, in affirming and enforcing the Board's
decision in Musser cautioned: " [w] e must guard against giving
this broad language a scope which includes employees whose rela-
tionship to the controversy is so attenuated as to cause their inclu-
sion to defeat a sound administration of the Act . . " 20 How-
ever, the court firmly concluded: "the closeness of Musser to the
dispute leads us to defer to the Board's interpretation which
brings. . . [Musser's] employees within the questioned pro-tection." 21
The protection afforded the individual employee against dis-
crimination by section 8(b) (2) of the Act is paralleled by the
16 It should be noted that the Board reached its conclusion by a 2-1-2
decision. The concurring opinion joined with the majority result by apply-
ing the right-to-control test. Using this same test, the minority found the
relationship to be too speculative and felt that section 8(a) (3) applied only
to cases where the employees are those of the coerced employer.
17 119 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1029 (1958).
isId. at 1030. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964).
19The Austin Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1257, 1258-59 (1952). See Local 24,
Teamsters (A.C.E. Transp. Co.), 120 N.L.R.B. 1103 (1958).
20266 F.2d 905, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
21d. The Supreme Court had concluded previously that the task of
defining "an employee" was the NLRB's since it was best equipped to do so.
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 126-30 (1944).
The rationale of the Miesser case, which the majority in the instant case
has overruled, was followed in Local 911, Teamsters (Wand Corporation),
122 N.L.R.B. 499 (1959). The dissent in Wand is of special interest,
because it is the forerunner of the instant case's majority. Both were
written by Member Fanning, who was not on the Board at the time of
Musser. In Wand, Member Fanning took as his main theme the proposition
that a union could lawfully "approach an employer to persuade him to
engage in a boycott' as had been enunciated in Local 1976, Carpenters
(Sand Door) v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 99 (1955), Member Fanning felt that
the authority of Musser was seriously impaired by Sand Door. It was
apparent, he said, that here was refutation of one of the basic approaches in
Musser, viz., that a union could not coerce employers legally without im-
pinging upon the individual rights of employees. Musser's rationale was,
however, followed again in the United Bhd. of Carpenters, 125 N.L.R.B.
853, 859, mwdified on other grounds, 286 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1960),
where a section 8(b)(2) violation was found.
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protection afforded the employer under section 8(b)(4) of the
Act. 22  Unions have traditionally resorted to both primary and
secondary pressures to achieve their aims, and this latter section
was intended to protect the neutral employer in a labor dispute
from secondary pressures by the unions.23  These pressures are
frequently referred to as secondary boycotts, but the Act does not
define the pressures as such; instead, it prohibits specific activities
and objectives.2 4  Judge Learned Hand's oft-quoted definition of
the secondary boycott is:
that its sanctions bear, not upon the employer who alone is a party to
the dispute, but upon some third party who has no concern in it. Its
aim is to compel him to stop business with the employer in the hope
that this will induce the employer to give in to his employees'
demands.25
A more concise definition would be "any activity which brings
about third party coercion, either of third parties or by third parties
or both." 26 The net effect is that coercion of the primary employer
is not a violation of the Act, whereas, in most cases, coercion of
the neutral (secondary) employer is a violation.27 The problem
exists in distinguishing between activity directed at the primary
employer and that directed at the neutral, secondary employer.
One suggested test is to determine "the direction of the threat or
force exerted." 28
An important element in determining the direction of the
activity is the situs of the labor dispute, i.e., wherever the primary
employer is working. This proposition was enunciated in the
Sailors Union (Moore Dry Dock) 29 case. There, a union picketed
22In pertinent part section 8(b)(4) reads as follows: "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization . . . to threaten, coerce, or
restrain any person . . . where . . . an object thereof is . . . forcing or
requiring any person . . . to cease doing business with any other person
." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1964).
23 Aaron, The tabor-Managenent Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
73 HA~v. L. REv. 1086, 1112 (1960).
24 Id. at 1112-13. See gewrally Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary
Boycott, 62 CoLum. L. REv. 1363 (1962).2 SInternational Bhd. Elec. Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34,
37 (2d Cir. 1950).
26 Lloyd & Wessel, Public Policy & Secondary Boycotts, 23 U. CiN. L.
REv. 31, 42 (1954).
27 Aaron, supra note 23, at 1116.
2s Richardson, The Taft-Hartley Act-Punishment or Progress, 42 Ky.
L.J. 27, 45 (1953).2992 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950). The test has been applied to non-ambulatory
situs situations. See, e.g., Retail Fruit & Vegetable Clerks, Local 1017(Crystal Palace Market), 116 N.L.R.B. 856 (1956), enforced, 249 F.2d
591 (9th Cir. 1957); Carpenters' Local 55 (PBM), 108 N.L.R.B. 363,
enforced, 218 F.2d 226 (10th Cir. 1954).
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a shipyard entrance to protest working conditions aboard a ship
in the yards. Although the case is primarily demonstrative of
the proposition that a situs can be mobile (in this case the ship),
the court established four conditions, the fulfillment of which would
mean that picketing a secondary employer is not a violation of
section 8(b) (4). First, the picketing must occur only when the
situs is on the secondary employers' property; second, the primary
employer, at whom the activity is aimed, must be at work in a
normal fashion at the situs; third, the picketing is limited to places
reasonably close to the actual situs; and fourth, the picketing
clearly demonstrates that the dispute is with the primary employer
only.3
0
Two important applications of the Moore Dry Dock case
should be noted. In Local 761, Electrical Workers v. NLRB,31
a section 8(b) (4) violation was charged against a union which
struck and picketed all five gates of a company plant, although one
of the gates had for some time been set apart for the use of
independent, neutral contractors. The Supreme Court held that
blocking the gate probably was illegal secondary activity, harming
the neutral contractors, but reversed and remanded in order for the
Board to determine whether the neutral contractors were doing
normal work for the company (in which case the thrust of the
picketing would be primary), or doing independent work on the
company grounds (in which case the picketing would be secondary).
In NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council,3- a
section 8(b) (4) violation was found where the labor organization
engaged in a strike, an object of which was to force the general
contractor to terminate its contract with a subcontractor who was
using non-union labor. Previously, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia had found the actions of the union to be
primary, and refused to enforce the Board's order.33 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that a union in dispute with a primary
party may not direct picketing against a neutral party in order to
enforce its demands.
In Local 447, Plumbers & Pipefitters (Malbaff), 3- the instant
case, Hart, a general contractor, let a subcontract to Malbaff Land-
scape Construction Company. Malbaff's employees were non-
union. A representative of Local 447 of the Plumbers and Pipe-
3092 N.L.R.B. at 549.
31366 U.S. 667 (1961).
32341 U.S. 675 (1951). But cf. Oil Workers Int'l Union, Local 346
(Pure Oil Co.), 84 N.L.R.B. 315 (1949) (causing cessation of business was
not an object of the strike).33 Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 326 (D.C.
Cir. 1951).
3 172 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 5 CCH LAD. L. REP. (1968-I OCH NLRB Dec.)
ff22,652 (June 24, 1968).
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fitters Union informed general contractor Hart that unless the
non-union men were taken off the job-site, there would be a picket.
Malbaff, when told of the pending situation, withdrew his employees
and filed charges against the union with the Regional Office of
the NLRB. Thereupon, the union advised Hart that its intention
was only to picket Malbaff, and in accordance with this union
assurance, Hart built a separate gate for Malbaff, who then
returned to work. The next day, the union commenced picketing
at the main gate (not the new, separate gate) carrying signs which
mentioned Malbaff only.
Up to this point, the union activity had fully conformed to
the test set forth in the Moore Dry Dock case. The union had
made clear in its picketing that its dispute was with Malbaff;
Malbaff was at work on its own subcontract work, located on the
general contractor's site; and the picketing was reasonably close to
Malbaff's work, even disregarding the presence of a separate gate.
However, picketing continued for five days, along with a work stop-
page, even after Malbaff's employees were forced to leave the site
for the second time. The general contractor, in order to complete
the job was ultimately forced to cancel the subcontract and com-
plete the work by alternative means. An illegal secondary boycott
by the union had apparently occurred.3 5 Had picketing continued
but a work stoppage not taken place after the departure of Mal-
baff's employees, secondary activity would have been less obvious,
but nevertheless a violation of 8(b) (4) under the Moore Dry Dock
approach.36
Unfortunately, the Board did not rule on whether the instant
case presented an illegal secondary boycott situation. The majority
states: "Whether Respondent [union] violated Section 8(b) (4) (B)
or any other section of the Act is not an issue in the case." 3 The
decision rejected the argument that the union had violated sections
8(b)(2) and 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act even though the union
objective was to force Hart to release Malbaff. This conclusion
was reached by the simple expedient of ignoring the basic concept
that employees can be hurt by the release of their employer.33
The Board specifically rejected what it considered to be the reason-
ing of the Musser majority: that a general contractor has a modi-
cum of "real control" over the employees of a subcontractor. "
35 This would appear especially clear, had Hart, the injured neutral con-
tractor, been a complainant.3 6 Accord, NLRB v. Plumbers Local 457, 299 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1962)
(threat of walkout communicated to general contractor and other neutral
employers to compel discontinuation of business).
3 172 N.L.R-B. No. 7, 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. (1968-4 CCH NLRB Dec.)
22,652, at 29,927 n.3 (June 24, 1968).381d. at 29,928.
3 9
'd.
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The Board cited the Denver case, to support its contention that
"doing business with a subcontractor does not derogate from the
independence of either or subject the employees of one to the con-
trol of the other as an employee." 4 0  But the Board majority's
choice of Denver is indicative of its weak position. Denver was
rejected as not having any bearing on the question of a section
8(b) (2) violation by both the court of appeals which enforced the
Musser order, and by the dissent in the instant case.41 Thus, the
essence of the majority opinion is that there can be no discrimina-
tion against employees who are not controlled by the alleged dis-
criminatory employer. Having come to the conclusion that Hart
had not been discriminatory because he did not control Malbaff,
the Board logically concluded that the union could not have been
guilty of unfair labor practices by exerting either direct or indirect
pressure on Hart.42
This conclusion flies in the face of prior decisions interpreting
the employer-employee relationship under section 8(a) (3). Chair-
man McCulloch hammers at this inconsistency and concludes that
the Musser decision was correct in its finding that a particular
employer-employee relationship need not exist, for an employer to
discriminate against an employee, and that a union which incited
such discrimination was guilty of violating sections 8(b) (2) and
8(b) (1) (A) of the Act.4  Thus, the instant case is generally
decided by the majority application of section 8(b) (2) of the Act
in a limited sense, rather than broadly, which as Chairman McCul-
loch suggests is its true import, i.e., the statute protects employees
generally, and individually, from labor actions from any quarter,
which might cause employers to discriminate against employees.44
The decision in the instant case exculpates labor at the expense
of the individual laborer.45  In finding no violation of employee
rights, the Board has left employee ranks with the perplexing
question of what remedy they may individually be left with, when
after union action such as the instant case presents, and after
loss of a contract, their employers lay them off for lack of other
work. This would seem especially problematical where the union
activity is conducted so carefully that it cannot be prosecuted as
illegal secondary activity. A recent Board decision may be ana-
4 0 d.4 1 1d. at 29,929 n.8 (dissenting opinion).
425 CCI LAB. L. RE'. (1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec.) ff 22,652, at 29,929
(June 24, 1964).
43 Id. at 29,930 (dissenting opinion).
44Id. at 29,929 (dissenting opinion).
45 See Local 57, ILGWU v. NLRB (Garwin Corp.), 374 F.2d 295 (D.C.
Cir. 1967), discussed in Petro, Expertise, The NLRB and The Constitution:
Things Abused and Things Forgotten, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 1126, 1131(1968).
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logized to demonstrate the problem. The case " presents the exact
point of view which the Board apparently wishes to foster: that
a union violation of section 8(h)(2) will be found only where it
causes an employer to discriminate against his own employees.
Violations of sections 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(1)(A) were charged
when a union threatened to strike, causing the employer to rescind
its agreement to employ a non-union man. A finding of union
violation was sustained by the Board. But suppose that the
employer had agreed to hire a one-man trucking corporation for a
small job, instead of merely an individual. Under the decision in
the instant case, a violation of section 8(b) (2) would not stand
because the employer would only be cancelling a contract with
another employer, and union activity designed to bring about such
a cancellation would not be illegal. Alternatively, consider whether
a violation of section 8(b) (4) could be found. If the union con-
fined its activity to the trucker, the activity could not be considered
illegal secondary action. And yet, the employer would have to get
another to do the job, and the trucker would have been dis-
criminated against, and out of a job.
While the NLRB has the power to determine the meaning of
the NLRA (subject to review), this narrow construction of a
broad protective legislative intent will deny the Board the latitude
it requires to administer justice equitably. The instant case nar-
rows the Board's ability to find a section 8(b)(2) violation when
there is a necessity to protect any individual employee. Protection
of the worker should be paramount to protection of unionism, and
the Board should at its first opportunity reestablish the principle
that an employer can be found guilty of discriminating against an
employee, even if he is not his own employee.
16 Teamsters Local 439 (Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express), 5 CCH
LAB. L. REP. (1968--2 CCH NLRB Dec.) It 20,175 (September 13.
1968).
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